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Postwar Violence in Guatemala: A Mirror of the 
Relationship between Youth and Adult Society
Sabine Kurtenbach, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany
Postwar societies are high-risk contexts for youth participation in violence. However, there is great variation between and within postwar societies. The variation 
of youth participation in postwar violence can best be understood by focusing on the consequences of war and war termination on youth socialization and 
transitions into adulthood. Socialization and transitions into adulthood stand at the center of the interaction between youth and adult society and help to ex-
plain the variation in youth violence in contexts of high structural risk.
Postwar societies are high-risk contexts for youth par-
ticipation in various manifestations of violence, including 
homicide, gang violence, armed conflict, or war recurrence. 
Although there are important differences regarding level of 
organization, patterns of mobilization, and goals, the struc-
tural risk factors discussed to explain youth participation are 
similar: marginalization and exclusion, destruction of pri-
mary social networks and social infrastructure, personal 
experience of violence, and state and society’s lack of capabil-
ity to provide opportunities for youth.1 While these risk fac-
tors are present in the majority of postwar societies, youth 
participation in violence is not omnipresent but differs 
between as well as within postwar societies. This article 
argues that these differences can best be understood by 
focusing on the relationship between youth and adult society.
Youth is a context-specific concept, whose beginning is 
mostly characterized by the end of primary education, the 
physical process of puberty, and growing independence 
from the family. The end of youth and the beginning of 
adulthood is more difficult to determine, as it depends on 
young people being accepted as adults.2 The termination of 
war significantly changes the perspectives of society on 
youth participation in violence.3 During war youth are 
mostly considered as victims even if they participate 
directly in violence (Machel 1996, 2001; UNICEF 2009). 
Outside of the context of war, on the other hand, youth 
participation in violence is mostly interpreted as deviant 
behavior (Heitmeyer and Legge 2008). These contradicting 
views are related to differences in the conception and fram-
ing of youth participation in violence. Young people’s par-
ticipation in war – either as part of a rebel group or as 
conscripts in the state’s armed forces – is mostly seen as 
subordinate to adult politics and agency.4 In postwar con-
texts violent young people are mostly seen as “trouble-
makers” (McEvoy-Levy 2006) or a security problem 
Thanks for comments on earlier versions of this 
article go to Sebastian Huhn, Peter Peetz, and the 
reviewers of the Journal.
1 On the risk factors drawing children and adoles-
cents into armed conflict see Brett and Specht 
(2004), Boyden and de Berry (2004), Hart (2008), 
Blattman (2009), on other contexts Dowdney 
(2005), Hagedorn (2007, 2008), Eisner (2002).
2 Most quantitative studies and international 
organizations use an age-specific definition. The 
United Nations World Youth Report (UN-DESA 
2007) uses the 15 to 25 cohort, the World Health 
Organization (WHO 2002) those between 15 and 
29.
3 While there are different definitions of war 
(qualitative and quantitative) there is a consensus 
that war is a specific form of collectively organized 
violence concerning political, economic, or social 
incompatibilities (Kurtenbach and Wulf 2012).
4 A recent series of case studies on the par-
ticipation of children and youth emphasized the 
options and possibilities young people acquire 
through participation in war and armed conflict 
(Richards 1996, Boyden and deBerry 2004, McEvoy-
Levy 2006).
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(Oettler 2011). Here they seem to act autonomously and 
“out of control.” These differences in perception reflect the 
changing relationship between youth and adult society 
according to different contexts (war or non-war).
This article argues that the variation of youth participation 
in postwar violence can best be understood by focusing on 
the consequences of war and war termination on youth 
socialization and transitions into adulthood. Socialization 
and transitions into adulthood stand at the center of the 
interaction between youth and adult society and help to 
explain the variation in youth violence in contexts of high 
structural risk. Transitions to adulthood in these contexts 
are difficult and challenging for young people as well as for 
adult society and reflect a society’s (in)ability to manage 
processes of societal change.
1. A Framework for the Analysis of Youth in Postwar Societies
Postwar societies are shaped by a variety of interacting 
influences due to differences in the specific patterns of war 
and its termination, external actors, and the historical and 
cultural context. The legacies of war depend not only on its 
intensity (regarding the death toll) but also on the geo-
graphical distribution of violence, the patterns of victimiz-
ation, the incompatibilities at stake, and last not least 
patterns of war termination. Until 1989 military victories 
were the most frequent pattern of war termination; since 
then the number of negotiated war terminations has 
increased significantly (Kreutz 2010). The form of war ter-
mination influences not only the capacities of formal state 
institutions to control violence but also the reconstruction, 
reform, or establishment of the broader set of secondary 
institutions of socialization (neighborhoods, communities, 
religious organizations). A military victory leads to com-
paratively stable postwar situations (victor’s peace) where 
one of the armed actors dominates and can establish a spe-
cific order (at least temporarily). The argument for peace 
agreements is that they may end war-related violence 
before a military victory is possible and provide the basis 
for consent between the warring parties. However, the 
resulting orders are shaped by divergent (sometimes 
contradicting) political, social, and economic agendas and 
instability (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Toft 2010). Regard-
less of their specific features, war and war termination pro-
duce winners and losers; they can provide social mobility 
but can also destroy social capital and infrastructure.
Research on the destructive effects of war on children and 
youth has been very prominent, although there is also an 
emerging strand of investigations into youth resilience and 
coping (Christiansen, Utas, and Vigh 2006). The ambiguity 
of the effects of war and war termination need to be taken 
into account in the analysis of postwar youth. Although 
there is a growing awareness of the existence of specific 
risks, youth-specific issues (or needs) do not figure promi-
nently on national and international agendas for postwar 
reconstruction. While programs target former child sol-
diers, most policies do not feature specifically youth-
oriented interventions (Kemper 2005; McEvoy-Levy 2008; 
Schwartz 2010).
The analysis of youth participation in postwar violence 
needs to focus on the main interface between youth and 
adult society, most of all socialization and transitions into 
adulthood. Here the consequences of war and the experi-
ence of violence shape adolescents’ capabilities to perform 
transitions as well as the capacities of state and society to 
reconstruct, adapt, or invent new pathways to adulthood.
1.1. Socialization and Transitions
Various institutions of socialization prepare adolescents 
for the transition into adulthood, introducing and fam-
iliarizing them with rules, values, and norms (Arnett and 
Galambos 2003; Arnett and Taber 1994; Arnett 1995; 
Berger and Luckmann 2009; Hurrelmann 2010). Dis-
tinctions can be made between sources of primary (family, 
school, peers) and secondary socialization (institutions 
and political processes), which are both important 
elements of the (re)production of social and cultural pat-
terns of socialization. Political socialization is “the way in 
which youths are brought into a political society estab-
lished by preceding generations” (Dawson, Prewitt, and 
Dawson 1973, 27). As a consequence, socialization has a 
certain conservative bias. However, young people are not 
just passive objects; socialization is an active process 
grounded in social practices “that may be habitual insofar 
as they are long lasting and become integral to one’s iden-
tity” (Youniss and Yates 1999, 8).
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Across the globe the transition to adulthood is marked by 
three interrelated status passages: family formation, econ-
omic independence, and political citizenship. While these 
transitions are quite universal, their specific form and the 
overall relationship between youth and adult society varies 
according to the cultural, temporal and historical context, 
as well as gender, place of residence, social status, political 
regime, and judical codes.5 These status passages are highly 
interrelated, with family formation for example depending 
on young men’s (and to a lesser degree young women’s) 
economic independence or at least the acquisition of suffi-
cient economic resources to establish an independent 
household or pay for a dowry or wedding (Mensch, Singh, 
and Casterlina 2005). At the same time, the economic 
opportunities and legal frameworks for family formation 
depend on patterns of political citizenship and the possi-
bilities for participation.
Postwar adolescents have been socialized in a context 
shaped directly or indirectly by violence. Being a victim, a 
witness, or a perpetrator of violence in childhood and ado-
lescence has consequences at the individual and collective 
levels; it will influence status passages, the development of 
identity patterns, and forms of social organization with 
peers. The experience of violence strongly influences pri-
mary socialization institutions (family, kin, neigh-
borhoods), for example through the death of family 
members, displacement or migration, or the physical des-
truction of communities. As a consequence the number of 
dysfunctional families and single-parent households 
increases, and adolescents often have to take over adult 
responsibilities. In war-affected regions access to important 
social infrastructures, such as health care, is reduced or 
unavailable. While the experience of violence might come 
to an end with the termination of war, the legacy of war 
and violence may persist for much longer. At the individual 
level traumatization is a case in point; at the collective level 
group solidarities and identities may be shaped through 
the experience of war (veterans are an example here); and 
last not least, formal and informal institutions of second-
ary socialization may have been destroyed or modified. The 
impact of these developments on adolescents is felt long 
after the end of the war, in a phenomenon first coined by 
Gertrude Stein as a “lost generation.” At the same time, 
established transitions into adulthood will be difficult to 
make in postwar contexts and new pathways might need to 
be developed or accepted.6 Seen from a conflict per-
spective, these contexts provide ample room for conflict 
and violence in the performance of transitions.7
1.2. Transitions in Postwar Societies
War and its legacies have a significant impact on the possi-
bilities for transitions into adulthood due to the political 
cost and the material destruction. Transitions into adult-
hood are not a one-way street where a young person 
merely needs to have the necessary skills or educational 
background to enter adult society. While youth training 
and capacity-building stands at the heart of international 
youth policy approaches (World Bank 2006), these skills 
may not always be useful, as capacities and context need to 
match. In the Middle East, for example, high unem-
ployment leading to a status of “waithood” is a major 
problem for university graduates, but to a much lesser 
degree for young people with little or no formal education 
(Dhillon and Yousef 2010). As a consequence the possibil-
ities for transitions depend on both individual skills and 
capacities of youth and on the specific opportunities 
society provides. The match is difficult in most postwar 
societies due to the impact of war.
Most postwar societies are poor, struggling with the out-
comes of war-time destruction, trying to (re-)construct 
material and social infrastructure. A recent UNESCO study 
(2011, 2) highlighted the fact that “countries affected by 
armed conflict are among the farthest from reaching the 
‘Education for All’ goals.” As a minimum of education is 
5 Most research on these transitions focuses on 
young people in the industrialized countries of the 
North, while information on young people in the 
global South has only emerged recently (Brown, Lar-
son, and Saraswathi 2002; Larsen, Brown, and Mor-
timer 2002; Lloyd 2005).
6 The studies on Rwandan and Burundian youth 
by Sommers (2012) and Uvin (2009) provide 
empirical evidence on the resulting problems and on 
possibilities for handling these. Honwana (2012) 
develops a similar argument for adolescents in Moz-
ambique, South Africa, Senegal, and Tunisia.
7 Although violence can play a role in family 
formation, this would have to be conceptualized as 
domestic violence, which is not included here.
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necessary to enter the labor market outside rural agricul-
ture, this is a serious barrier to economic independence for 
many adolescents specifically in urban contexts. Barker 
(2005, 115) summarizes the resulting problem: “If work is 
an imperative to achieve a socially recognized version of 
manhood, the syllogism is that no work means no man-
hood.” In postwar societies the impossibility of performing 
the school to work transition makes family formation dif-
ficult or even impossible as a certain degree of economic 
independence is the central prerequisite for this. 
Sommers’s (2012) study on Rwandan youth shows how 
this leads to increasing levels of frustration.
The current debate on the negative impact of “idle young 
men” on violence is based on a twofold argument: (a) a 
pool of unemployed young men lowers the opportunity 
costs for recruitment into armed formations; (b) par-
ticipation in violence (ranging from war to armed conflict, 
gangs, and homicide) provides young men opportunities 
for personal and/or collective enrichment and economic 
independence. These assumptions stand at the core of the 
“youth bulge” hypothesis, which portrays young men as 
the main group responsible for high levels of violence and 
a security risk for society.8 Most postwar contexts feature a 
young population and a lack of economic opportunities. 
From the perspective of transitions into adulthood, par-
ticipation in violence can provide opportunities for social 
mobility and economic independence and may thus be a 
rational choice. However, the functions of violence for 
youth have only received attention in the last decade (Brett 
and Specht 2004; Coulter, Persson, and Utas 2008; Peters, 
Richards, and Vlassenroot 2003; Richards 1996).
The main recipe for economic recovery and reconstruction 
in postwar societies is macro-economic growth (Collier et 
al. 2003, 152–57), education (for children and adolescents), 
and job creation (for adolescents and young adults). The 
underlying assumption is that a successful transition from 
school to work is the main mechanism for young people’s 
integration into society (UN-DESA 2012). But the effects 
of growth on the labor market depend more on the specific 
development model and its need for skilled or unskilled 
labor, as well as on possible alternatives like migration. This 
has received little attention, although the drama of youth 
unemployment has at least been acknowledged for coun-
tries like Spain and Greece. A report by the International 
Labor Organization states: “It is fairly safe to argue, there-
fore, that the true ‘lost generation’ of youth is the poor in 
developing regions” (ILO 2010, 2) and warns against the 
dramatic consequences of failed transitions for both youth 
and society. Many postwar societies provide empirical evi-
dence for this.
Transitions to citizenship are also complex. Patterns of 
citizenship, political participation, and civic engagement 
are highly dependent on the characteristics of the politi-
cal regime young people grow up in. Experiences of 
repression, marginalization, or participation have long-
enduring consequences (Youniss and Hart 2005). Longi-
tudinal research shows that political engagement during 
adolescence has lasting effects on norms and values and is 
the most important predictor of adult political attitudes.9 
The political regime has been an important cause for the 
onset of many wars. At the same time political regimes 
tend to militarize during war, reinforcing hierarchical and 
authoritarian structures of control. After the termination 
of war, most contemporary postwar societies experience 
dramatic changes in their political regime, at least at the 
formal level, due to external and internal demands for 
democratization (Jarstad and Sisk 2008). This has 
important implications for transitions into adulthood, as 
democratization gives young people a set of rights (for 
example, to vote and to be elected) and formal equality 
with their elders. As the political sphere continues to be 
8 A youth bulge is a product of demographic 
change that occurs when mortality fall before fertil-
ity rates; in this case, the cohort between age 15 and 
24 is disproportionately large compared to the adult 
population. Fuller (1995), Huntington (1997), and 
Cincotta, Engelman, and Anastasion (2003) have 
popularized the “youth bulge thesis” in security 
studies. While there is no linear relationship, there is 
some evidence that an excess of young males with-
out prospects might increase violence or at least lead 
to conflict-prone environments. Urdal (2006) argues 
that youth bulges are related more to less organized 
forms of low-intensity political and intra-state viol-
ence than to large-scale wars.
9 For a similar argument see the special issue of 
New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development 
(Flanagan and Christens 2011), especially Flanagan 
et al. (2011) (Flanagan et al. 2011)with evidence 
from developing countries.
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dominated by adults, existing patterns of youth inte-
gration or exclusion can be an important factor of ten-
sion (or even violence). Any analysis of transitions to 
citizenship in postwar contexts needs to include the for-
mal possibilities of youth participation and integration as 
well as other patterns of civic engagement such as youth 
participation in civil society organizations and/or relig-
ious groups.
However, exclusion and inclusion are not caused by a 
single factor or set of factors; they are the product of the 
accumulation of risk. Economic opportunities for youth 
are important, but the political contextual factors that 
result in blocked transitions and functional equivalents to 
blocked transitions are seldom analyzed. While most 
research accepts the importance of the political regime, 
patterns of governance, and politics in general, the import-
ance of these factors for youth transitions is primarily ana-
lyzed in relation to youth in the industrialized and 
democratic countries of the West (Youniss and Yates 1999, 
Youniss and Hart 2005, Youniss and Levine 2009, Sherrod, 
Torney-Purta, and Flanagan 2010, Sloam 2012). Here civic 
behavior such as voting or participation in civil society 
organizations is shaped by a variety of influences during 
adolescence: family interest and involvement, school cli-
mate and civic education, community engagement, media, 
religiosity, class, and race (Sherrod 2006, Hart and Lakin 
Gullan 2010). With respect to developing countries, 
research on youth activism and political engagement has 
tended to focus on young people’s engagement in anti-
colonial and independence struggles during the 1960s and 
1970s (Honwana 2012, 14-15). There has been little recent 
research on youth civic engagement in developing coun-
tries (Kassimir and Flanagan 2010). Although the “medi-
ating institutions” influencing youth civic engagement are 
context-specific, we can assume that they fulfill similar 
functions in different contexts. However, to date there is 
little evidence about how these mediating institutions play 
out in the developing world.
Blocked transitions to adulthood produce high levels of 
insecurity and tension. Participation in violence can pro-
vide possibilities for youth to overcome exclusion and to 
acquire status, recognition, and resources. Research on 
youth participation in armed conflict and other forms of 
violence (gangs, crime, homicide) increasingly investigates 
this relationship.10 But many case studies on youth transi-
tions in high-risk environments show that even under the 
most difficult circumstances only a minority of young 
people participate in violence; most of them cope or “navi-
gate” otherwise (Christiansen, Utas, and Vigh 2006). The 
following case study on postwar youth in Guatemala pro-
vides empirical evidence for the added value of the 
approach outlined above. The underlying hypothesis is that 
variations in participation of youth in postwar violence are 
shaped by the experiences of socialization during war and 
the possibilities of transitions into adulthood. Guatemala’s 
postwar violence is mostly analyzed under the perspective 
of rising transnational and petty crime. Young males are 
seen as the main group of perpetrators (Huhn, Oettler, and 
Peetz 2009; Oettler 2011). However, variation of adoles-
cents participation in violence is high and shaped by the 
different experiences with socialization and transitions into 
adulthood as the following sections will show. Evidence 
stems from field research 2007 and 2013, where semi-
structured interviews were conducted with representatives 
of state and civil society organizations, youth organiz-
ations, human rights defenders, and aid agencies, as well as 
with local social scientists researching violence, postwar 
developments, and youth transitions.11
2. Guatemala’s Youth during and after War
Guatemala is the largest country in Central America, with a 
long history of violent conflict. The social and political 
10 Nevertheless, research on youth and violence is 
highly gendered. While young men are discussed as 
perpetrators of violence, women and children are 
mostly conceived as victims. More recent approaches 
show a more differentiated picture, where young 
men are not only perpetrators but also the biggest 
group of victims, and in some contexts girls and 
young women may also be perpetrators, using viol-
ence for example to break out of traditional roles or 
age hierarchies. On female fighters in African wars 
see West (2004), Coulter, Persson and Utas (2008), 
Specht (2006); on girls in gangs see Moore (2007).
11 Original field research on youth in postwar 
Guatemala was funded through a research grant 
from the German Peace Foundation funding for the 
project “Social and Political Fractures after Wars: 
Youth Violence in Cambodia and Guatemala” at the 
Institute for Development and Peace at the Univer-
sity of Duisburg-Essen from 2006 to 2008. An 
update in the field was possible thanks to the par-
ticipation in the University of Denver’s (Korbel 
School) project on “Religion and Social Cohesion in 
Conflict-affected Countries.”
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marginalization of the poor, rural, and mostly indigenous 
population is the major grievance driving these conflicts.12 
In the second half of the twentieth century the opposition 
against authoritarian regimes formed various guerrilla 
groups. The first phase of the war was mostly restricted to 
the east of the country; during the second phase in the 
1980s the military used a scorched earth tactics to sub-
jugate the indigenous population in the Western High-
lands. More than 200,000 people died and more than a 
million and a half were internally or externally displaced. 
However, international pressure and regional dynamics led 
to a political opening in 1986 and a peace process during 
the 1990s. The war ended formally with the signature of a 
comprehensive peace agreement in 1996 (CEH 1999, Jonas 
2000, Kurtenbach 2008, 2010). The current youth cohort 
(age 15 to 29) is the first generation of Guatemalans to 
grow up in a formally democratic regime after the end of 
the most repressive and violent phase of the war.13
2.1. Youth and Direct Participation in War
During the twentieth century Guatemala’s youth has par-
ticipated in different forms in the social, political, and 
armed opposition (Handy 1984, 224ff.; Levinson 1988). 
After the first guerrilla groups were defeated at the end of 
the 1960s, state repression was relaxed a little. During the 
1970s young people and adult regime opponents again 
mobilized in a variety of social movements. In the rural 
areas Acción Católica sowed the seeds for the organization 
of cooperatives and community programs. In Guatemala 
City students and professors at the public University of San 
Carlos were the most active. Students took to the streets to 
protest the suspension of constitutionally guaranteed 
rights and supported the demands of trade unions and 
reform-oriented political parties (such as the Christian 
Democratic Party). Students provided legal assistance for 
free in public places as well as in slums. Even young people 
that did not go to school but had to work for their living 
were politically active founding trade unions. The roots of 
many current human rights organizations date back to 
these years. Young people were part of a broader opposi-
tion movement, but often the main protagonists as in the 
first protests against bus price increases in Guatemala City 
in 1978, which ended with the deaths of more than fifty 
protesters.
The state responded with repression and many young 
activists (Ladinos as well as indigenous) joined the guer-
rilla groups regrouping mostly in the Western Highlands. 
There were various reasons to join the guerrilla: to avoid 
military conscription (Arias 1990, 252), to struggle for 
social change, or as a means of everyday survival.14 
Although the Guatemalan guerrilla never matched the 
military power of its Salvadoran or Nicaraguan counter-
parts, state repression was fierce and directed overwhel-
mingly against the indigenous population, in particular 
young males (CEH 1999).
Ladino and indigenous youth were also involved on the 
government side through (voluntary and forced) recruit-
ment into the armed forces and the paramilitary PAC (Pat-
rullas de Autodefensa Civil). In 1981 twenty-four-month 
conscription for young men aged eighteen to twenty-four 
was introduced, and extended to thirty months shortly 
afterwards. This affected between 7,000 and 8,000 adoles-
cents per year.15 While in the rural areas 10 to 20 percent of 
an age cohort had to do their military service, youth from 
better off strata were able to circumvent conscription 
(Smith 1990, 10). At the same time young men hanging 
around the street corners of marginalized suburbs of 
Guatemala City were simply picked off the street by the 
military, put into uniforms, flown to the Highlands to fight 
(interview with youth organization, Guatemala-City, June 
12 Guatemala’s indigenous population consists 
mostly of descendants of the Mayan peoples who are 
divided into twenty-four language groups plus 
numerically small groups of Xinca and Garífuna. 
Although Guatemala’s conflict is classified as “eth-
nic” in some databases such as Cederman, Buhaug, 
and Rød (2009) the differences between the indigen-
ous population (40–60 percent) and the Ladinos (of 
both indigenous and European ancestry) are a 
mostly a matter of self-identification. Using one of 
the Maya languages and wearing traditional clothing 
are the main characteristics for being perceived as 
indigenous. However these habits change according 
to different contexts (e.g. rural and urban).
13 Two excellent surveys on this age cohort inform 
the following empirical section (SESC 2012, PNUD 
2012) together with interviews conducted during 
field trips, mostly in 2007 and 2013.
14 Kobrak (2003, 42–45) writes that in Huehue-
tenango the EGP (Ejército Guerrrillero de los 
Pobres) did not as a rule accept members under the 
age of 15.
15 There was also forced recruitment into the PAC, 
which according to the Truth Commission also 
affected twenty thousand children (CEH 1999).
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2007). Hence the war affected youth differently according 
to social status: while marginalized, socially and politically 
excluded adolescents had to fight, those belonging to the 
better-off social strata were able to just live their “normal” 
lives.
2.2. The Impact of War on Socialization and Transitions
Besides direct participation, the war had profound con-
sequences for youth socialization and transitions to adult-
hood in certain geographical areas of Guatemala and 
during the most violent years. During the first phase of war 
in the 1960s the east of the country was most affected, 
leading to a wave of internal migration towards the capital 
(Poitevin 1990, 92). The second phase during the 1980s 
forced over one million people to leave the Western High-
lands. “Migration had two negative consequences on 
society. It destroyed families as the primary structure of 
society and promoted cultural fragmentation”. Those dis-
placed to the cities needed to hide their indigenous iden-
tity, as the government equated being indigenous with 
supporting the armed opposition (interview, Universidad 
Rafael Landivar, Guatemala City, May 2007). Only a small 
percentage of refugees (around 10 per cent) were able to 
reach camps run by the UNHCR providing basic social 
infrastructure. The majority had to resettle under military 
control or in the marginalized sectors of Guatemala City 
where even the most rudimentary forms of social infra-
structure like water, energy, and sanitation were absent, 
likewise access to education.16
As a consequence the war had a strong impact on primary 
and secondary socialization sources in the war-affected 
zones:
• Families and primary social networks: Migration, dis-
placement, and violence tore apart the nucleus of stable 
social relations for young people. During the second 
phase of the war around 50 percent of refugees were 
children and adolescents, and between 100,000 and 
500,000 children were orphaned (CDHG 1986, 95–96). 
The related lack of even rudimentary forms of security 
affected the development of stable personalities and 
trust in others.
• Schools: Public resources were spent on the war rather 
than on education. Massive recruitment of children into 
the armed forces and paramilitary organisations in-
creased educational disparities between the indigenous 
and nonindigenous populations, as well as between in-
digenous populations in war-affected and non-war-af-
fected areas (UNESCO 2011, 136). As a consequence 
public schools were not able to provide even minimal 
formal education.
• The political regime was authoritarian during most of 
the war. A process of political opening began with elec-
tions to a constitutional assembly in 1985. However, 
most of the military’s prerogatives were preserved and 
civilian government and parliament (elected in 1986) 
had little influence. While the peace agreements in-
cluded significant provisions to strengthen civilian 
power over the military, Guatemala’s transition re-
mained stuck at the level of electoral democracy with 
high levels of political volatility and populism (Jonas 
2000; Kurtenbach 2008). Young people’s political so-
cialization is shaped by the fragmented and volatile 
political environment.
• Religion and identity groups: After Spanish colonization 
Catholicism had a religious monopoly in Guatemala. 
The war increased the influence of Protestant sects from 
the United States, which emphasize extreme forms of 
individualism and undermine existing forms of social 
control and solidarity (Gros 1999; LeBot 1999). This in-
creased the overall fragmentation and lack of social 
cohesion in Guatemalan society. On the other hand, the 
shared experience of repression was an important driver 
for the establishment of a common Mayan or indigen-
ous identity across the different linguistic groups. 
Nevertheless, the war reinforced existing divisions and 
exclusionary patterns of social cohesion.
16 For a description of life under these circum-
stances see Bastos and Camus (1994, 61–93).
17 As indigenous identities in Guatemala depend 
mostly on self-identification, the distinction 
between indigenous and nonindigenous tends to be 
rather fluid. While indigenous people tried to hide 
their “ethnic” identity during the war due to state 
repression, in recent years there has been a strong 
revival of indigenous identities (Bastos and Cumes 
2007).
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These war-related influences on socialization sources are 
an important factor for blocked transitions into adulthood 
after the end of the war. In the cases of economic indepen-
dence and political citizenship this is obvious.
After the end of the war Guatemala experienced a phase of 
impressive macro-economic growth (PNUD 2010, 321) 
that did not, however, translate into better opportunities 
for the school-to-work transition. The Latin American 
Opinion Survey (Azpuru 2012, 17–20) reveals the impact 
of place of residence and ethnic identification: Urban resi-
dents have more formal schooling (8.8. versus 5.3 years) 
and can translate this into higher income. The National 
Youth Survey (SESC 2011, 51–79) provides information on 
the relationship between education and labor market: 
Youth with only basic school education show the lowest 
participation in the job market (26.5 percent), while those 
with a university degree perform best (83.5 percent). In 
1995, one year before the war ended, 35 percent of Guate-
mala’s fifteen-year-olds were illiterate (Walter 2000, 17), 
while 44.5 percent had just three years of schooling. Family 
and personal relations remain the most important factor 
for entering the job market after leaving school (74.7 per-
cent) and for survival. Around two thirds of working youth 
give more than half their wages to the family they live with; 
at the same time, wages are the primary source of income 
for only 36 percent of young people, while 56 percent 
depend on transfers from parents or spouses and are thus 
in a situation of economic dependency. In this situation a 
government program was designed to promote first 
employment for youth. “As it only included one thousand 
young people it was doomed to fail” (interview, Human 
Rights organization, Guatemala City, May 2007).
While deficits in public schooling are one factor, the econ-
omic development model and the related political prior-
ities are at least as important. Poitevín and Pape (2003, 94) 
point out that education has not been a priority for any 
Guatemalan government during recent decades because it 
was unimportant (or even counterproductive) for the 
agro-export economy, which is based on cheap labor. 
Guatemala’s elite only agreed to the peace agreement 
because the economic and social status quo was main-
tained. Although one of the peace agreements announced 
moves toward more inclusive economic development, there 
has in fact been little change and patterns of exclusion have 
become even more pronounced. The few existing possibil-
ities for upward social mobility have been curtailed as the 
state bureaucracy (including the armed forces) was down-
sized due to the end of the war (reducing the manpower of 
the armed forces) and the neoliberal structural adjustment 
policies pursued by all post-war governments. Youth 
employment statistics (age 15 to 29) show a seven per-
centage point reduction in formal employment between 
1989 and 2011 (PNUD 2012, 120). But although this is a 
general trend, indigenous youth and young females were 
less affected than non-indigenous male youth. The chang-
ing patterns of Guatemala’s export sector explains this in 
part, as textile and agro-industrial maquilas overwhel-
mingly employ female youth (over 60 percent are young 
women between age 14 and 25; PNUD 2012, 130).
To summarize, a combination of factors including the 
impact of war on education and the lack of job creation 
hamper the school-to-work transition and economic inde-
pendence. As a consequence male urban Ladino youths 
seem to have more problems in the school-to-work transi-
tion than rural indigenous youth, as the latter survive in 
the remnants of subsistence agriculture. For some Ladino 
youth migration provides an escape. According to the 
Human Development Report (PNUD 2005, 356), 78.9 per-
cent of Ladinos have family outside Guatemala (but the 
highest proportion in the indigenous population is in 
Quiche with 6.9 percent). At the same time 59.1 percent of 
internal migrants are Ladinos (PNUD 2005, 354).
Political participation could be an important means of 
change. Since the political opening a set of formal civil 
rights for young people are at least formally guaranteed, 
specifically the right to vote and to be elected (age 18 and 
older), as well as the right to assembly and association. But 
youth participation in these processes is rather limited: 
During the first decade of the twenty-first century 60 per-
cent of youths (here age 18–29) did not vote although this 
age cohort constitutes over one third of the country’s elec-
torate (PDH 2004, 22; PNUD 2012, 142). If they organized, 
youth could thus gain a significant share of parliamentary 
seats. Participation in national political parties is even 
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lower and most governments have ignored youth as 
citizens.
However, young people do participate in other social 
spaces. According to the national youth survey (SESC 2011: 
131–47) around 45 percent of youth (age 15 to 29) are 
members of youth organizations (religious, sport, commu-
nity) with differences regarding gender (more males than 
females), geography (more urban than rural), and level of 
formal education. These patterns of engagement reflect 
confidence in the related organizations as political parties 
and the parliament come last in surveys of “positive” con-
fidence (PNUD 2012, 141). Not surprisingly, young people 
with a higher level of education and a better economic 
background have most confidence in their personal future 
and in the government.
While Guatemalan society offers young people formal 
possibilities to engage in politics, the majority of youths do 
not make use these options. One explanation lies in the 
nature of Guatemala’s clientelistic political system. Per-
sonal experiences illustrate the frustration of young people. 
In Huehuetenango – a majority indigenous department 
bordering Mexico – young people active in human rights 
organizations advocated the rule of law and promoted civil 
conflict resolution. But their work was not very popular 
with the authorities dominated by the older generation. 
Members of the Commission on Children and Adolescents 
report that they were only able to do advocacy work when 
the governor was sympathetic to their proposals. Support 
from international development organizations enabled 
them to organize assemblies of children and adolescents 
and develop projects for the municipal development plan. 
But even if approved at the local level, realization of the 
projects depended on support from the national congress. 
In this process priorities formulated at the local level were 
changed according to clientelistic and electoral consider-
ations (interviews, Huehuetenango, May 2007). Another 
interesting experience is the organization of indigenous 
adolescents affected by war and violence. After living in 
refugee camps, communities in resistance or even par-
ticipating as child soldiers, they began to organize and 
founded the Maya Youth Network (Red de Jóvenes Mayas, 
RENOJ) in 1999. However, RENOJ does not have an 
explicit political agenda but does mostly advocacy work 
regarding indigenous youth needs and international net-
working (interviews, Huehuetenango, May 2007).
To sum up, the new opportunities of political participation 
provided by – at least formal – democratization offered 
limited possibilities for change. However, success depends 
on the mobilization and organization of youth as well as 
on the ability (and the political will) of political actors to 
acknowledge and prioritize youth participation, agency, 
and needs. Neither the Guatemalan state nor civil society 
addressed youth-specific problems such as education and 
unemployment.
2.3. Youth and Postwar Violence
Guatemala’s war termination is considered a success, as 
there was no recurrence of war. However, Guatemala has 
high levels of postwar violence. Interpersonal violence 
(homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, UNODC 2011) 
declined between 1996 and 1999, but increased until 2009 
and then declined again until recently. After the end of war 
there was some reduction in state repression but the overall 
level remains high according to international human rights 
reports, such as those by Amnesty International or the US 
Department of State (www.politicalterrorscale.org). 
Although age-specific data on perpetrators in these mani-
festations of violence are not available, discourse in media 
and politics has been dominated by the scandalization of 
youth as the main perpetrators of violence, focusing mostly 
on gangs (maras).18
But while postwar Guatemala is one of the most violent 
countries worldwide, the amount of violence varies sig-
nificantly at the sub-national level (CIEN 2002; PNUD 
2007). Currently the country’s south-eastern departments 
bordering Honduras are the most violent exhibiting homi-
cide rates of 79 per 100,000 inhabitants, Guatemala City 
comes second with 54 per 100,000, followed closely by the 
18 This was a regional trend, see Huhn, Oettler, 
and Peetz (2009).
IJCV: Vol. 8 (1) 2014, pp. 119 – 133
Sabine Kurtenbach: Postwar Violence in Guatemala 129
department of Petén bordering Mexico with 50 per 
100,000.19
Young males participate in these different manifestations of 
violence but are neither solely responsible nor the only per-
petrators; they also make up the majority of victims.20 
Youth gangs provide a feeling of belonging, solidarity, and 
identity. They have a long history in Guatemala but have 
changed significantly over time (Levenson-Estrada 1988, 
2013; FEPAZ 2005). From the mid-1980s to 1996 they 
operated almost exclusively in the capital and delinquent 
activities were mostly related to petty theft and drug con-
sumption. Between 1996 and 2003 these groups con-
solidated and expanded to other regions, increasing 
violence and criminality (assassinations, territorial con-
flicts, assaults). Since then there has been an increasing 
transnationalization with Salvadorian and US gangs, as 
well as an escalation of violence.
While blocked transitions into adult society are an import-
ant structural risk factor for participation in gangs, they 
seem to be more important for the transition to economic 
independence than for political participation, as most of 
Guatemala’s maras have no political agenda. However, 
youth involvement in violent crime seems to be smaller 
than politicians and media assume. The only quantitative 
study on gangs finds that 57 percent of Guatemala’s gang 
members work in the noncriminal economy and 45 per-
cent of gang members need to support their families finan-
cially. At the same time they supplement low incomes with 
criminal activities like theft and drug dealing (Demoscopía 
2007, 47–60).
The increasing levels of violence are mostly a result of the 
state’s repression and “hard hand” approaches. Over the 
last decade human rights organizations report an increase 
in extralegal executions of marginalized youth by members 
of the police, private security companies, and local security 
councils (Flores 2013; Samayoa 2007). Like other Central 
American governments, different Guatemalan governments 
have introduced strategies of zero tolerance and criminal-
ized not only gangs but marginalized youths in general. 
Gang members are rarely jailed; instead they are the pre-
ferred victims of “social cleansing” policies (PDH 2004). 
These policies are not carried out officially under the aus-
pices of the state, but instead resemble the counterinsur-
gency strategies of the war, when the military murdered 
anybody suspected of collaborating with the insurgency.
To sum up, youth violence in Guatemala seems to be a 
result of dysfunctional families and failed school-to-work 
transitions. Here urban male Ladino youth are most 
affected. This happens in a context where Guatemalan 
society is unable (and unwilling) to provide channels for 
social change and upward social mobility. The main 
sources of disconnect between youth and adult societies are 
closely related to processes of agency, subordination, and 
control. Violent adolescents serve as scapegoats supporting 
the continuity of repressive answers leading to “perverse 
patterns” of state formation (Pearce 2010). Like other 
places with high levels of youth violence such as El Sal-
vador and South Africa (Heitmeyer and Legge 2008; Jones 
and Rodgers 2009, Marks 2001), urbanization and 
migration are important factors influencing the relation-
ship between state, society, and youth producing high levels 
of fragmentation and the erosion of social cohesion. State 
and society have been unable (and/or unwilling) to replace 
traditional patterns of youth integration or to empower 
youth to accomplish the transition into adulthood without 
violence. In the indigenous highlands, the situation for 
youth has been slightly better as decentralization and 
indigenous empowerment seem to provide young people 
with more options for the future.
3. Postwar Violence as a Mirror of Youth–Society Relations
The impact of war and patterns of war termination shape 
youth socialization processes and the opportunities pro-
vided by state and society for the transition into adulthood. 
19 http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/
guatemala-murder-hotspots-mapping, January 31, 
2013; Moser (2001, 104) compiled a (non-
representative but quite plausible) timeline showing 
a significant increase in violence from Friday to Sun-
day and a strong correlation with the consumption 
of alcohol and other drugs. On the broader relation-
ship between drugs and violence see Eisner (2002).
20 Research on youth violence and gangs in Cen-
tral America focuses mostly on the causes, micro-
level dynamics, and policy responses. See among 
others ERIC et al. (2001ff.); Rodgers, Muggah, and 
Stevenson (2009). The first and only comparative 
quantitative study is Demoscopía (2007).
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While the personal experience of violence is important, in 
the case of Guatemala the main factors for blocked transi-
tions are related to the broader structural processes in 
politics and economy. Despite the signing of compre-
hensive peace accords, provisions aiming at profound 
societal change were implemented either partially or not at 
all. Guatemala’s traditional economic and political elite 
blocked every initiative to change the existing economic 
development model until today.
While the debate on risk factors for youth violence focuses 
on the influences of war and violence on social capital 
(Coletta and Cullen 2000), the impact of different patterns 
of war termination and reconstruction for youth sociali-
zation and transitions remains under-researched. The case 
study of Guatemala shows that the reconstruction or 
reproduction of youth integration might be feasible in 
those (mostly rural) contexts where the war supported pro-
cesses of ethnic self-identification (“mayanization”; Bastos 
and Camus 2007). Youth transitions are much more dif-
ficult in urban spaces, where they are subject to rapid social 
change and high levels of disintegration. Here ethnic iden-
tities get lost or (in the case of Ladino youth) never existed. 
The spatial concentration of interpersonal violence and 
state repression in Guatemala’s urban centers and frontiers 
shows how the legacy of war-related migration and the lack 
of legal economic opportunities merge to generate high 
levels of postwar violence. Focusing just on youth as the 
main perpetrators of postwar violence neglects the political 
responsibilities of other actors in state and society, namely 
Guatemala’s economic elite and its refusal to implement a 
more inclusive development model. The case study on 
Guatemala shows that the analysis of the broader relation-
ship between youth and adult society is a much more 
important explanatory factor for different levels of youth 
participation in postwar violence than the mere existence 
of risk factors at the individual and collective levels.
Experiences in other postwar societies seem to support this 
perspective. Nicaragua, for example, is a deviant case 
regarding youth violence in Central America. While some 
argue that gangs are an increasing problem (Rodgers 
2003), the relationship between youth and society is quite 
different to the other countries. Nicaragua’s government 
and state institutions such as the police have promoted 
inclusive, not mainly repressive, policies towards youth 
(Rocha 2008). South Africa, on the other hand, is an 
example of a country where youth/society relations have 
been strained since the end of apartheid, thus leading to a 
high level of youth violence (Marks 2001). Cambodia 
exemplifies how an authoritarian regime may direct “youth 
violence” for its own purposes, when young demonstrators 
destroyed the Thai embassy in 2003 (Hensengerth 2008). 
Comparing Burundi and Rwanda, Sommers and Uvin 
(2011; Sommers 2012; Uvin 2009) observe significant dif-
ferences in societal response to the problem of performing 
traditional status passages into adulthood. In both coun-
tries the most important prerequisite for marriage is to 
build a house, which is hindered by high levels of unem-
ployment and lack of access to resources. But while Burun-
dian society interprets existing norms in a rather flexible 
way, Rwanda’s government policies on housing aggravate 
young people’s problems. Although (at least until now) 
this has not led to mounting levels of violence, it is an 
important source of young people’s frustration about their 
future perspectives.
Although these examples and the case of Guatemala only 
offer preliminary evidence, they point towards the necess-
ity of a shift in focus: Academic research as well as policy 
approaches should analyze youth participation in postwar 
violence less from a perspective of deviant behavior and 
more as the result of youth/society relations. We need to 
analyze the different patterns of youth economic and civic 
participation beyond the use of violence. This is essential 
not only for understanding the challenges in intergener-
ational relations and the blockades in the transition 
towards adulthood, but also for the formulation of youth 
policies by governments and NGOs, as well as by external 
donors.
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